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The shot-noise unit in continuous-variable quantum key distribution plays an important and
fundamental role in experimental implementation as it is used as a normalization parameter that
contribute to perform security analysis and distill the key information. However, the traditional
calibration procedure and detector model can not cover all system noise in practical application,
which will result in some loopholes and influence the practical security. What’s more, the traditional
procedure is also rather complicated and has difficulty in compatible with automatic operating
system. In this paper we propose a calibration model based on the proposed trusted detector
model, which could naturally close the loopholes in practical application. It can help identify the
shot-noise unit in only one step, which can not only effectively simplify the evaluation process but
also reduce the statistical fluctuation, while two steps are needed in traditional method. We prove its
feasibility and derive the complete version of the corresponding entanglement-based model. Detailed
security analysis against arbitrary collective attacks and numerous simulation results in both the
asymptotic limit regime and the finite-size regime are provided. A proof-of-principle experiment has
been implemented and the results indicate that the one-time-calibration model can be employed as a
powerful substitution to calibrate the shot-noise unit. Our method paves the way for the deployment
of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with real time calibration and automatic operation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] is designed
with the aim of realizing a physical-principle guaran-
teed secure key distribution between the two legitimate
parties: Alice and Bob . Continuous variable (CV)
QKD [4, 5] is developed little posterior to discrete vari-
able QKD but becomes more appealing by virtue of
its adaptability of implementing in existing commer-
cial telecom systems. CV-QKD protocols using coher-
ent states [6, 7] is considerably simple to implement and
reverse reconciliation of CV-QKD protocols can break
through the “3dB” limitation in reconciliation process [8]
thus they are generally applied in most of the experiment
demonstrations. Moreover, finite-size effect has also been
extensively studied as its impact commonly influences
the practical CV-QKD system performance [10–12]. The
maximum achievable secret key rate of QKD has also
been investigate as the PLOB bound[13, 14].
CV-QKD protocol using Gaussian modulation coher-
ent states can achieve a relatively higher secret key rate
and its security has been proved against arbitrary attacks
in both asymptotic regime and finite-size regime [10–
12, 15–18], thus is getting more popular in recent years.
Experimental demonstrations based on laboratory con-
ditions have been conducted to prove its feasibility and
field tests based on real-life environmental conditions are
carried out subsequently for the future practical applica-
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tions [19–22, 26]. The longest distance of the practical
field experiments that has been reported is 50km [27].
Recently, great efforts made in the proving of the secu-
rity of CV-QKD with discrete modulation and several
progress has achieved. [23, 24]. In all CV-QKD system,
the shot-noise unit (SNU) plays an important and funda-
mental role because the calibrated SNU will be treated
as a normalization parameter to quantize the quadrature
measurement results which will eventually contributes to
estimate the secret key rate.
However, previous experiment demonstrations usually
applied the two-time-evaluation (TTE) procedure [20,
22], which requires first measuring electronic noise of the
practical homodyne detector then measuring the output
of homodyne detector with the local oscillator (LO) path
taken on. In this way, the SNU is calibrated by using
the results of the second measurement results minus the
electronic noise from the first measurement results which
is obviously a rather complicated procedure. And since
the SNU is not measured directly, it will certainly bring
in more inaccuracy. Notwithstanding, such calibration
scheme can open security loopholes that the eavesdropper
Eve can utilize to procure the key information [28, 29].
Eve can take actions to change the SNU during the key
distribution procedure, then the SNU used to normalize
the measured quadratures will not be the same as the
real SNU, in this way Alice and Bob are prone to under-
estimate the channel excess noise that further threats the
security of the CV-QKD system. Also, the imperfections
of the homodyne detection can also affect the evalua-
tion of SNU. Adopting SNU monitoring is a commonly
used countermeasure against such attack, while local LO
2scheme where the LO is generated by Bob using an in-
dependent laser can effectively resist attacks against the
calibration of the SNU [30, 31].
In this paper, we propose a one-time-calibration
model that uses two beamsplitters to imitate the im-
perfections of homodyne detector in the corresponding
entanglement-based (EB) model. The new calibration
model can simplify the calibration procedures as it does
not require measuring the electronic noise for each use
of the practical systems. We simply measure the out-
put of the homodyne detector with the LO path con-
nected, and take that measurement result as a new SNU.
Also, the statistical fluctuation of SNU introduced by
the calibration procedures can be reduced by applying
the one-time-calibration model. Detailed analysis on the
secret key rate calculations and performances of the pro-
posed model are fully provided. Finally, we consider the
proposed model in finite-size regime to testify its perfor-
mance in a more practical environment. We remark that
the one-time-calibration model can basically approach
the system performance to the original two-time cali-
bration model in both asymptotic regime and finite-size
regime. A demonstration experiment is conducted in or-
der to indicate its eventuality and the results proves that
the one-time-calibration model provides us a better sub-
stitution when performing calibration procedures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II,
we review the definition of SNU then provide introduc-
tion of the conventional method applied in estimating
SNU and the limitations exist under such method. In
Sec. III we propose the complete one-time-calibration
procedure where we start from the practical output of
the homodyne detector. In Sec. IV, we mainly focus on
the performance of the one-time-calibrationmodel, where
we present the key rate calculation of the model in de-
tail, and then analyze the model behaviour under finite-
size regime. We also provide multiple simulation results
and give meticulous discussions in this section. We pro-
vide experiment details in Sec. V and the conclusions are
drawn in Sec. VI.
II. CALIBRATION OF SHOT-NOISE UNIT
In this section we first review the conventional trusted
noise and trusted modelling of the homodyne and hetero-
dyne detector, then describe the conventional approach
of calibrating the SNU. Lastly, we point out the limita-
tions in the existing SNU calibration method.
A. Conventional trusted detector modelling
We start by reviewing the trusted noise modelling of
the homodyne and heterodyne detector. Usually a homo-
dyne detector or a heterodyne detector has two main im-
perfections: a finite detection efficiency η, and electronic
noise εele [20]. In the untrusted modelling, the imperfec-
FIG. 1. (Color online) The detailed entangle-based trusted
homodyne detector modelling, the transmittance of the beam-
splitter is used to imitate the detection efficiency while the
variance of the EPR state is used to imitate the electronic
noise. The mode B3 is then detected by either homodyne
detecor or heterodyne detector.
tions of the practical homodyne and heterodyne detector
contribute to the channel loss or the channel excess noise
that controlled by the eavesdropper Eve. While another
way of modelling the homodyne or heterodyne detector
is trusted modelling, ground on which the assumption is
made that the apparatus of Bobs set up is not accessible
to Eve [32]. This way we can consider the imperfections
of the homodyne or heterodyne detector as trusted loss
and trusted noise. The trusted modelling can improve
the system performance as it slightly restricts Eves abil-
ity.
The EB version of the trusted model of the homodyne
and heterodyne detector is depicted in Fig.1. In this
model, the limited detection efficiency is modeled by a
beamsplitter whose transmittance is used to imitate the
detection efficiency, while the electronic noise is mod-
eled by an EPR source whose one mode is coupled into
the quantum signal coming from the channel through the
beamsplitter, and the variance added by this coupling is
used to imitate the electronic noise.
The availability of both the untrust and trust mod-
elling relays on the equivalence of the EB model and the
prepare-and-measure (PM) model. So, we subsequently
write out the output of a practical homodyne detector in
the corresponding PM model:
Xout = AXLO
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+Xele, (1)
where Xele is a Gaussian variable with variance vel which
normally has a Gaussian distribution, A is the circuit
amplification parameter.
While however, sequence of the result from the homo-
dyne detection can not be used directly. To the purpose
of analyzing Eve’s information from the output Xout, we
need to quantize this value using the SNU:
xSNUout =
Xout√
SNU
=
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+
Xele
AXLO
.
(2)
3The output sequence of xSNUout corresponds to output
of its EB model, which is depicted in FIG.1.
The inspiring method of using local local oscillator to
interference with the quantum signal in the detection
stage can defend all kinds of attacks against the local
oscillator. Albeit, the local laser has fluctuations itself,
and the electronic noise of the detector also suffers from
the undulation due to the environment change for ex-
ample the temperature change. Thus even adopting the
local local oscillator scheme the calibration procedure is
certainly required. The proposed measurement-device-
independent protocols also are dedicated to defend all
kinds of attacks against the homodyne detector, requires
proper calibration of the SNU [33–35].
B. Conventional shot-noise unit calibration:
two-time-calibration method
In this subsection we review the conventional way of
calibrating the SNU.
Typically, two step are required to perform the SNU
calibration, Step 1, Calculate the variance of the homo-
dyne detector output with both quantum signal and LO
taken off as the electronic noise Vele. Step 2, Calculate
the variance of the homodyne detector output Vtot with
only the LO path connected, as a total noise of electronic
noise as well as shot-noise unit. After these two steps, one
could calculate the shot-noise unit through the equation:
SNU = Vtot − Vele. (3)
In the following we also use SNUTTE to refer this kind
of calibration method. In practice, even under the as-
sumptions of untrusted modelling, the electronic noise is
still known from the corresponding PM model regardless
of the EB scenario adopted in the security analysis in
order to obtain the SNU. Thus, the trusted modelling is
more reasonable in the EB scenario.
C. Limitations with the conventional calibration
First and foremost, the Vtot in Eq. (3) is more
than the vacuum noise plus the electronic noise, other
noises including the relative intensity noise (RIN)
should be included. So Vtot should be rewritten as
Vtot = SNU + Vele + V RIN , as is described in Eq. (3),
the SNU calculated is SNUTTE = SNU + V RIN . More
precisely, the output of the practical homodyne detector
should be rewrite as:
Xout = AXLO
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+Xele +XRIN .
(4)
The sequence of the raw key after the SNU normalization is thus given by:
xSNU
TTE
out =
Xout√
SNU + VRIN
=
AXLO√
SNU + VRIN
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+
Xele +XRIN√
SNU + VRIN
. (5)
Thus, the equivalence between the PM model with the EB version of the model does not hold anymore.
Yet, as can be seen from Eq. (2), any incorrect es-
timated SNU will cause the false approximation of the
statistics, furthermore, security analysis suggests that
slightly error in the SNU estimation can greatly decrease
the secret key rate.
In a realistic scenario, the inaccuracies of the SNU can
result in drastically decreasing in the estimated secret key
rate through the security analysis. The simulation result
is displayed in Fig.2. It can be seen that even with an
0.1% deviation from the real SNU, the secret key rate can
significantly drop to zero when the transmission distance
is over 50km.
Moreover, attacks against the SNU can severely threat
the security of the practical CV-QKD systems. For in-
stance, the response curve of the homodyne detector is
normally calibrated before the distribution stage, so Eve
can launch an attack that controls the LO signal [29],
which can delay the trigger of the detector. This way,
the actual slope of the response curve will be decreased,
then if Bob still employs the original response curve to
evaluate the SNU, the SNU will be overestimated, which
further will lead to the underestimate of the excess noise.
Also, attack against the intensity of the LO [28] during
the key distribution stage can also cause the misestimate
of the SNU, the noise induced by Eve’s attack may be
underestimated if Bob applies the calibrated SNU to nor-
malise its data. Thus a security loophole may be turned
on.
Under the conventional implementation, each optical
path of signal and LO will require an optical switch,
which will inevitably increase costs, complicate the SNU
calibration procedure as well as data processing proce-
dures. While adding optical switch in the LO path also
decreases the optical power, which is no good to the ho-
modyne detection that demand a sufficient amplification
on the LO signal.
Since the variance of the electronic noise and the to-
tal noise variance are measured separately, the SNU is
not directly evaluated. According to Eq. (3), using sub-
traction to calculate the calibrated SNU introduces more
statistical fluctuations since both the electronic noise and
the total noise variance suffers from the finite-size effects.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Simulation result of the secret key
rate as a function of transmission distance with perfect SNU
calibration as well as with error of 0.1% and 0.3% of SNU. The
black solid line represents the secret key rate with a perfect
SNU calibration. The blue dashed line represents the secret
key rate with a 0.1% of SNU calibration error whereas the
red dotted line is the secret key rate with a 0.3% of SNU
calibration error. The variance of the EPR is set to 40. The
channel excess noise is in the simulation εc = 0.01, and the
electronic noise vele = 0.01, the limited detection efficiency
ηd= 0.6 and the reconciliation efficiency η= 0.956 [36].
In practice, we will need twice the calibration period to
evaluate both Vtot and Vele, which suggests that the num-
ber of the data that are used to distill the key informa-
tion also ineluctably reduced. As is discussed above, for a
block length of N samples, whereM1 samples are used to
calculate the variance of the electronic noise,M2 samples
are used to compute the total noise variance, then only
N−M1−M2 samples can be used to perform distillation.
The above problems build barriers that will restrict the
performance of the practical CV-QKD systems. In next
section, we present the one-time-calibration model that
is carefully designed to surmount the problems above.
III. ONE-TIME SHOT-NOISE UNIT
CALIBRATION
Compare to the original evaluation model, we now pro-
pose a calibration model which only requires one-time
evaluation. Under this modelling, the limited detection
efficiency and electronic noise of the practical detector is
still considered as a trusted noise and only one optical
switch in the LO path is demanded in the corresponding
PM scheme.
A. Entanglement-based model of trusted detector
modelling
In this model, we still consider the electronic noise and
the limited detection efficiency as the main imperfections
of the practical homodyne detector. Two beamsplitters
are applied to represent the electronic noise and the lim-
ited detection efficiency respectively in the correspond-
ing EB model. In this scenario, the electronic noise is
modeled by the transmittance of the beamsplitter. As
is depicted in Fig. 3, the transmittance ηd of the first
beamsplitter D1 equals to the efficiency of the detector,
while the transmittance ηe of the second beamsplitter D2
models the electronic noise.
In order to keep consistent with the previous SNU cal-
ibration of the experimental demonstrations, in the fol-
lowing we still do not consider the RIN specifically, where
we recognize the RIN is included in the SNUTTE of the
conventional calibration model. We only need to mea-
sure one time to identify the SNU when we exploit this
model. The new SNU is measured as the output when
the LO signal is on, so the new SNU can be rewritten as:
SNU ′ = Vtot = SNU + Vele, (6)
where SNU ′ is the new calibrated shot-noise unit, SNU
is the shot-noise unit measured from two-time evaluation
procedure.
Under this modeling, certain advantages can be pro-
cured: Firstly, we only need one optical switch in signal
path in our system. Secondly, only one-time calibration
is required in this model, which makes it a more util-
ity model applying in practical systems. Thirdly, since
we only need one-time period to calculate the shot-noise
unit, the statistic fluctuation is minimized compared with
original calibration model with two-time evaluation.
To analyze the one-time-calibration model in detail,
certain assumptions about the homodyne detector are
made in the first place:
1.The loss in Bob’s side will not leak any information to
Eve.
2.The electronic noise is not caused by Eve, and will not
leak any information to Eve.
3.The electronic noise is an additive Gaussian noise.
We draw the complete EB version of the one-time eval-
uation model for particular analysis. The beamsplitter
B1 is utilized to stimulate the electronic noise of the prac-
tical homodyne detector. Detailed analysis of the deriva-
tion are described as follows: We start with considering
the ideal homodyne detection, let us take x-quadrature
for instance:
xˆhom =
√
ηe
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+
√
1− ηexˆv2, (7)
where xˆv1, xˆv2 indicate the vacuum coupled-in by the two
beamsplitters. Vacuum state xˆv1, xˆv2 are two Gaussian
variables.
5FIG. 3. (Color online) The entanglement-based model of one-time evaluation model. The model is based on coherent states
and homodyne detection where Alice applies an heterodyne measurement on one mode of the EPR states, the other mode
is sent to the quantum channel and measured by homodyne detection. The two other beamsplitters are used to imitate the
electronic noise and the limited detection efficiency.
Nevertheless, we can consider the electronic noise as
another “optical mode”, then we can define a joint shot-
noise unit called SNUOTE , which counts both the quan-
tum signal and the optical mode. The new joint SNU
will be:
SNUOTE = A2X2LO +
〈
∆X2ele
〉
= A2X2LO + vel. (8)
So the data after quantization using new joint SNUOTE is:
χSNU
OTE
out =
Xout√
SNUOTE
=
AXLO√
A2X2LO + vel
(
√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1) + Xele√
A2X2LO + vel
. (9)
Considering Xele is a Gaussian variable and it is immune to Eve, accordingly we can replace it with a Gaussian
operator:
√
velxˆv2, in which xˆv2 has the variance of 1. Then:
xSNU
OTE
out =
AXLO√
A2X2LO + vel
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+
√
vel√
A2X2LO + vel
xˆv2. (10)
Now if we define ηe =
A2X2LO
A2X2LO+vel
, then equation(8) can
be rewrite as equation(3), then xnewout = xˆhom.
Thus we have also derived the corresponding EB ver-
sion of the model and the equivalence between the PM
model and the EB model is built. The PM model is used
for actual implementation in the system while the EB
model is used for security analysis. Our derivation guar-
antees that the measurement results of mode B3 in the
EB scheme are the same as the output of the PM scheme.
Therefore, in this EB scheme, we never change the unit
of the vacuum, the variance of the vacuum is always 1.
This implies the EB model can describe the practical PM
scheme where the measurement output is quantized by
the SNUOTE .
In this scheme the dissipation incurred by the imper-
fections of the homodyne detector can be observed intu-
itively. When the electronic noise is not too big, it can
simply be modelled as an extra loss at the receiver’s side.
For example, we assume the detection efficiency is 0.65,
the clearance between the SNU and the electronic noise
is normally required above 10dB, which in total a 2.3dB
loss is acquired, which is equivalent to a 11km fiber loss.
For those homodyne detectors that employ higher SNU
over electronic noise like 15dB, the total loss of the homo-
dyne detector is around 2dB which is about 10km fiber
loss, which is quite acceptable in a realistic set up.
Next we quickly review the case where the RIN is tak-
ing into the consideration: In this case we identify the
SNUOTE as:
SNUOTE = SNU + Vele + VRIN . (11)
To build the equivalence between the PM model and the corresponding EB model, we start by the output of the
practical detector of the PM model in equation(1), next we quantize the output sequence of the detector by this
SNUOTE as:
xout =
Xout√
SNU + Vele + VRIN
=
AXLO√
SNU + Vele + VRIN
(√
ηdxˆB +
√
1− ηdxˆv1
)
+
Xele +XRIN√
SNU + Vele + VRIN
. (12)
6In this scenario if we define
√
ηe =
AXLO√
SNU+Vele+VRIN
, then the output of the PM model equals to that of the EB
model in FIg.3, thus the equivalence between the EB model and the PM model holds, which proves that the one-time
calibration model can extended the security analysis in the trusted modelling and the SNU calibration process when
any other addictive noise is considered.
B. One-time shot-noise unit calibration method
From a perspective of practical security, real time cal-
ibration can defense most attacks against LO or detec-
tors but it would demand seamless switching between the
SNU evaluation and the key distribution. Thus one opti-
cal switch is needed in the signal path, when the optical
switch is connected, the system performs key distribu-
tion, when the optical switch is taken off, the system
performs SNU calibration.
With our intuition of solving problems appeared in
subsection 2.3, adopting one-time-calibration process we
can circumvent the usage of the optical switch on the LO
path. It makes the real time calibration possible since the
optical switch on the LO side can decide whether the sys-
tem is in key distribution scheme or in SNU calibration
scheme. The optical power is maximally to be retained
thus it also helps amplifying the quantum signal.
Furthermore, the data used to perform calibration is
rather limited especially when more data are required to
distill key information. So the finite-size effect need to be
carefully considered to help understand the effect caused
by the finite data. For the one-time-calibration model
the SNU in this scenario is directly measured thus the
statistical fluctuation is suppressed. In Fig.4 we provide
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Normalized SNU and deviation with
ideal calibration as a function of block length. Black lines
are simulation results under the conventional model while red
lines represent the one-time calibration model. Dash lines are
simulation results of the normalized SNU as a function of the
number of the calibrated data, solid lines are the deviation
between the two models compare to ideal calibration. The
total noise variance are set as 2.3768 where the electronic noise
is 0.421. the failure probability of parameter estimation εPE,
the failure probability during privacy amplification procedure
εPA and the smoothing parameter ε¯ are all set as 10
−5.
the simulation result that explores the SNU behaviour
of the one-time calibration model as well as the conven-
tional model. In order to maximally imitate the practical
realization we take the total noise variance as 2.3768 and
the electronic noise variance 0.421. The simulation result
shows the normalized SNU as a function of block length.
In order to intuitively observe the deviation owing to the
finite-size effects, we define another variable that mea-
sures the difference between the ideal calibration and the
practical normalization. The simulation result is drawn
in the right Y axis as a function of block length. Al-
though the two model behave quite the same when the
block length is over 108, from the deviation compared
to the ideal calibration the one-time evaluation model
has better performance than the conventional calibration
model against finite-size effect.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL
SIMULATION
The proposed one-time-calibration model that helps
reduce the system complexity and achieve seamless real
time SNU calibration is distinctly more compliance with
piratical key distribution scenario. Further, we have ex-
tended the security analysis where the equivalence of
the PM model and the EB model is built up in a more
practical implementations where noises like RIN can be
taken into consideration. In this chapter we give exhaus-
tive analysis on the performance of one-time-calibration
model. Secret key rate calculations in both asymptotic
regime and finite-size regime are provided while numer-
ous simulation results are illustrated to show their be-
haviours compared to the original calibration model.
A. Asymptotical regime
The complete EB version of the one-time evaluation
model is pictured in Fig.1. In our proposed model, the
electronic noise ηe is not directly measured, thereby the
secret key rate calculation may not be so straightforward.
As a preliminary consideration, Alice’s data and Bob’s
data are directly acquirable from the experiment in the
PM scheme thus mode A and mode B are what we can
at least conclude in the corresponding EB model. Al-
though mode C and mode D are not controlled by Eve,
we merely ignore then at the moment. In this scenario
the covariance matrix used to calculate the key rate is a
four-order covariance matrix:
7γAB3 =
(
γA φAB3
φTAB3 γB3
)
. (13)
The covariance matrix of AB′ can be deduced as:
γAB3 =
(
V I2
√
TCηdηe (V 2 − 1)σZ√
TCηdηe (V 2 − 1)σZ [TCηdηe (V − 1 + εc) + 1] I2
)
,
(14)
where V is the variance of EPR state in EB model, TC
indicates channel transmissivity and εc is the channel
excess noise. I2 is second-order identity matrix and σZ
is a 2*2 matrix:
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
The main focus of secret key rate calculation is how
to evaluate the upper bound of the information that Eve
can procure. We restrict ourselves to reverse reconcilia-
tion [9], and the secret key rate is calculated as:
R = βI(A : B3)− I(B3 : E), (15)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency. The mutual in-
formation between the two legitimate parties Alice and
Bob can be described by Shannon entropy which can be
written as:
IAB3 = H(B3)−H(B3|A), (16)
where H(B) can be calculated as 12 log2VB, H(B|A) is
the conditional Shannon entropy that can be calculated
as 12 log2VB|A, the conditional variance VB|A means the
remaining uncertainty on Bob’s variance after the mea-
surement on Alice’s side. According to equation(10), we
can derive IAB as:
IAB3 =
1
2
log2(
V + χ
χ+ 1
), (17)
where we define χ as χ = 1Tηdηe − 1 + εc for conciseness.
Now we derive the mutual information between Bob
and Eve, the maximum information between Eve and
Bob is decided by the Holevo interval [37] χB3E :
χB3E = S(ρE)−
∫
dmB3p(mB3)S(ρ
mB3
E ). (18)
According to the Fig.1, eavesdropper Eve and the mea-
surement will both purify the system AB′, then χBE
should be written as:
χB3E = S(ρAB3)− S(ρmB3A ), (19)
where S(ρAB3) and S(ρ
mB3
A ) can be figured out by calcu-
lating the symplectic eigenvalues of the correspondence
covariance matrix γAB1 and γ
mB3
A , where γ
mB3
A is the co-
variance matrix of modes A and B3 after Bob performing
detections:
χB3E =
∑2
i=1
G(
λi − 1
2
)−
∑4
i=3
G(
λi − 1
2
), (20)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x, and λi are
the symplectic eigenvalues. We have already derived the
covariance matrix of AB1, so its symplectic eigenvalues
λ1, λ2 can be subsequently derived:
λ21,2 =
1
2 [A±
√
A2 − 4B],
A = V 2(1− 2Tηeηd) + 2Tηeηd + (Tηeηd)2(V + χ)2,
B = (Tηeηd)
2(V χ+ 1)2.
(21)
Next we calculate the symplectic eigenvalues of the co-
variance matrix of γmBA . After the quantum signals arrive
at Bob’s side, Bob can take whether homodyne detection
or heterodyne detection to measure the quantum states.
Considering most practical systems would use homodyne
detection at present, in this paper we analyze the sym-
pletic eigenvalues after Bob performs homodyne detec-
tion.
Bob performs homodyne detection on mode B, mea-
suring whether its coordinate x or momentum p. After
detection, mode A will be projected to new Gaussian
state, where the covariance matrix will become:
γ
mB3
A = γA − σAB3(XγB3X)MPσTAB3 , (22)
where γA, γB3 , σAB3 are corresponded with equation(9),
and we find that γ
mB3
A takes the form:
γ
mB3
A =
(
V χ+1
V+χ 0
0 V
)
. (23)
The symplectic eigenvalue of this matrix is:
λ23 = V (
V χ+ 1
V + V χ
). (24)
Now we can calculate the upper bound of information
that Eve can procure. Combining with the equation(11)
and equation(14), the secret key rate is calculable.
In the above scenario we include mode A and mode
B3 into our security analysis, we call it two-mode EB
model. However, we scarcely exploit the features of the
two beamsplitters that represent the homodyne detector
imperfections in the EB model which may result in the
underestimating of the secret key rate. In the follow-
ing we manage to take these imperfections into trusted
losses. By permuting the two beamsplitters, we can take
the mode C that models the detector efficiency into Bob’s
side. The feasibility of the permuting operation is based
on the trusted homodyne detector assumption. The
8eavesdropper Eve cannot take control of the homodyne
detector, the permuting operation will not affect detected
mode B3, thus it will not influence Eve’s knowledge about
Bob’s result. After the permuting of the beamsplitters,
we obtain a new EB model and since mode B3 remains
unchanged, this new EB scheme is still a match with the
PM scheme that uses SNUOTE to quantise the measure-
ment output. The complete EB version of this scenario
is traced out in Fig. 3 and in total modes A, B3 and
C are comprised into consideration. In this case mode
D that represents the electronic noise is still unknown to
us, but the detection efficiency is a known quantity. Thus
we may obtain the covariance matrix with there mode A,
B3 and C, we call it three-mode EB model, and it should
take the form of:
γACB3 =

 γA φAC φAB3φTAC γC φCB3
φTAB3 φ
T
CB3
γB3

 . (25)
Alice first generate two-mode squeezed state then send
one of its mode to the quantum channel, before it goes
through the first BS, the state of the system AB1
′ is
a pure state with the expectation of 0, the covariance
matrix of modes A and B1
′ is:
γAB1′ =
(
V I2
√
T (V 2 − 1)σz√
T (V 2 − 1)σz [T (V − 1 + εc) + 1]I2
)
.
(26)
After the quantum signal goes through the first BS,
AB2
′D is a pure state, it can be described with covariance
matrix γAB2′D:
γAB2′D = (Y
BS)T [γAB1′ ⊕ I2](Y BS). (27)
The covariance matrix γAB1′ performs kronecker prod-
uct with vacuum state since no other signal is needed to
couple in the beamsplitter in this scenario. Y BS is the
transformation matrix of the first beamsplitter, which
models the electronic noise of the practical homodyne
detector:
Y BS = I2 ⊕ Y BSηe , (28)
where Y BSηe is the symplectic matrix of the beamsplitter:
Y BSηe =
( √
ηeI2
√
1− ηeI2
−√1− ηeI2 √ηeI2
)
. (29)
However we do not measure the electronic noise di-
rectly which implies we do not know the mode D in this
one-time evolution model. For the rest, the covariance
matrix γAB2′ is:
γAB2′ =
(
V I2
√
Tηe(V 2 − 1)σz√
Tηe(V 2 − 1)σz [Tηe(V − 1 + εc) + 1]I2
)
.
(30)
After passes through the second beamsplitter, which is
considered as a trusted loss, the covariance matrix γAB3C
should be able to procure:
γAB3C = (Y
BS′)T [γAB2 ⊕ I2](Y BS
′
), (31)
where Y BS
′
is the transformation matrix that imitate the
limited detection efficiency of the practical beam splitter:
Y BS
′
= II2 ⊕ Y BSηd . (32)
Y BSηd is the symplectic matrix of the beamsplitter:
Y BSηd =
( √
ηdI2
√
1− ηdI2
−√1− ηdI2 √ηdI2
)
. (33)
Now the covariance matrix of three modes A,B3 and C
can be calculated using equation (29).And it is supposed
to achieve a higher secret key rate compare to the two-
modes model aforementioned.
γAB3C =

 V I2
√
Tηeηd(V 2 − 1)σz
√
Tηe(1 − ηd)(V 2 − 1)σz√
Tηeηd(V 2 − 1)σz [Tηeηd(V − 1 + εc) + 1]I2
√
ηd(1− ηd)Tηe(V − 1 + εc)I2√
Tηe(1− ηd)(V 2 − 1)σz
√
ηd(1− ηd)Tηe(V − 1 + εc)I2 [Tηe(1− ηd)(V − 1 + εc) + 1]I2

 . (34)
In this case, the secret key rate is calculated the same
way as Eq. (13). The mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob is figured as Eq. (14) with the variance
of EPR state at Alice’s side V , variance at Bob’s side
(Tηeηd(V − 1 + εc) + 1) and covariance between Alice
and Bob (Tηeηd(V
2 − 1)) which gives exactly the same
results as the two-mode model scenario as Eq. (15).
Next we estimate the upper bound of information be-
tween Eve and Bob, according to Eq. (16), χBE is now
rewritten as:
χBE = S(ρAB3C)− S(ρmB3AC ). (35)
S(ρAB3C) is Eve’s Von Neumann entropy, since Eve
9FIG. 5. (Color online) Three-mode entanglement-based model of the one-time-calibration model. Coherent states and
homodyne scenario are taken as an example, where Alice one mode of the EPR source is measured by the heterodyne detection
while the other mode is sent through the quantum channel and measured by Bob using homodyne detection. In this three-mode
EB scenario we treat the limited detection efficiency as a trusted loss thus it is been taken into Bob’s side. While the electronic
noise has been considered as a channel loss.
purifies the system AB3C. It can be figured out with the
symplectic eigenvalues of the corresponding covariance
matrix γAB3C , but there is one eigenvalue that constantly
equals to one, which means it contains no information,
while the other symplectic eigenvalues contributes to the
entropy. S(ρ
mB3
AC ) is the Von Neumann entropy of the
remaining quantum states have after Bob performs ho-
modyne detection. So over all, the mutual information
between Eve and Bob can be can be further exploit as
the same as Eq. (18).
λ1 and λ2 are derived from covariance matrix
S(ρAB3C):
λ21,2 =
1
2
[A±
√
A2 − 4B], (36)
where parameter A and B are:
A = C(2 + C)−D + 1,
B = V 2[(1− ηd)ηdC2 + C + 1]2−
V [(1− ηd)ηd]2C2D − (1− ηd)ηd[(1− ηd)ηdC2 + C + 1]D2.
(37)
Here we note C = Tηe(V − 1 + εc), D = Tηe(V 2 − 1)
for shortness.
Next we figure out the symplectic eigenvalues of ma-
trix γ
mB3
AC to calculate S(ρ
mB3
AC ). γ
mB3
AC is the covariance
matrix after Bob applies homodyne detection which can
be derived from:
γ
mB3
AC = γAC − φACB3(XγB3X)MPφTACB3 . (38)
It has two non-zero symplectic eigenvalues so the sym-
plectic eigenvalues should have form of:
λ23, 4=
1
2
[E2 ±
√
E2 − 4F 2], (39)
where E, F are defined as:
E = GV+V
2−2(1−ηd)D+(C+1)[(1−ηd)C+1]
ηdC+1
,
F = [ηdG+VηdC − (1− ηd)D(
ηdC
ηdC+1
− 1)2][(1 − ηd)G + V ],
(40)
where C and D have been defined previously. We noted
symbol G as G = Tηe[V (εc − 1) + 1] for shortness.
While we are still not satisfy that mode D is practi-
cally controlled by Eve as we do not know the electronic
noise at this stage. The electronic noise is viewed as the
transmittance of the beamsplitter which can be treated
as a loss. In realistic experiments, this loss may be calcu-
lated from the data of Alice’s and Bob’s, it will express
as the product of the channel transmittance T and the
transmittance of the beamsplitter ηe. To the purpose of
ultimately finding out the value of ηe, we can find some
restrictions to limit the possible values of ηe:


const. ≤ T ≤ 1,
const. ≤ ηe ≤ 1,
T ηe = const,
(41)
where we assume that const. is the transmittance that
represents the total loss from channel and electronic
noise. Although it seems that there are plenty of valid
values that ηe may take, we still have to limit ourselves
so that the lowest secret key rate can be achieved. And
we note that the value is when the channel transmittance
T takes the value of const., thereafter ηe will may only
take the value of 1. It suggests that there is no elec-
tronic noise existed, all that loss is contributed by the
untrusted channel, essentially, this resultant is realised
because the lowest secret key rate may be obtained when
the untrusted party controls all the loss. It will no longer
have mode D and the EB model virtually retrogrades to
the scenario where we only consider A,B3 and C afore-
mentioned. Therefore, we may not consider Eve purifies
A,B3, D and C as S(ρE) = S(ρACDB3) in the EB model,
but as S(ρE) = S(ρACB3), in the form of equation (31).
B. Finite-size regime
In this section, we analyze the finite-size regime on the
proposed models as well as the original model and mainly
focus on the effect on shot-noise calibration. We first
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analyze its influence on shot-noise calibration procedure,
then calculate the secret key rate of the proposed models
based on covariance matrices.
As is discussed in section III, the original calibration
procedure needs two steps to obtain the SNU result. Re-
garding the new model however, we define the measure-
ment results of the output when the LO path is con-
nected as shot-noise unit, as in equation (3). According
to the theory of finite-size analysis [38], the finite-size
block will bring in more statistical fluctuations compare
to the asymptotic regime, which will lead to the decreas-
ing of the secret key rate. The importance of conducting
finite-size analysis in CV-QKD systems has been exten-
sively demonstrated. Succeedingly the secret key rate
calculation needs to be revised:
R =
n
N
[βI(A : B)− IεPE (B : E)−∆(n)], (42)
where N is the block length and n is the number of data
that used to distill the key information.
We now consider the influence on shot-noise unit of
finite-size regime. Maximum likelihood estimation is ap-
plied and we can describe the shot-noise unit as:
Vˆtot =
1
m
∑m
i=1
(y0i)
2
. (43)
The ’hat’ in the above equation suggests that it is an
estimated value. We then apply law of large numbers
to acquire the approximate distribution of the shot-noise
unit:
mVˆtot
Vtot
∼ χ2(m− 1), (44)
where Vtot is the actual value of the variance of the SNU,
χ2 means chi-square distribution. By combining the fail-
ure probability during the parameter estimation process
εPE , we can compute the fluctuation interval for an iden-
tified confidence interval. Then by traversing through the
confidence interval, we can seek out the worst case. Here,
we set the confidence interval as εPE/2, so the range of
the fluctuated shot-noise unit can be calculated as:
∆Vtot = zεPE/2
Vˆtot
√
2√
m
, (45)
where zεPE/2 satisfies 1− erf(zεPE/2/
√
2)/2 = εPE/2,
and erf is the error function that defined as:
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (46)
Therefore, the final shot-noise unit SNU ′ is:
SNU ′ ∈ [Vˆtot −∆Vtot, Vˆtot +∆Vtot]. (47)
Based on the explication above, the confidence inter-
val of shot-noise unit of the original two-time evaluation
model under finite-size effect should be described as:
SNU = [Vˆtot−∆Vtot−Vˆele−∆Vele, Vˆtot+∆Vtot−Vˆele+∆Vele].
(48)
Vˆele is the estimated electronic noise which is corre-
sponding to the system output when both the quantum
signal path and LO path are turned off. And conse-
quently ∆Vele is the statistical fluctuation that this mea-
surement brings in.
Since the influence of finite-size effect on shot-noise
unit has already been studied in detail, next we exploit
how it changes the secret key rate calculation. We noted
the shot-noise-unit as N0 for simplicity. For the two-
mode model scenario, the variance of mode B3 and co-
variance AB3 vary as the shot-noise unit changes. So the
covariance matrix needs to be rewritten in order to take
consideration of the effect of shot-noise unit:
γAB3 =
(
V I2
√
Tηeηd(V 2 − 1)/N0σz√
Tηeηd(V 2 − 1)/N0σz {[Tηeηd(V − 1 + εc) + 1]/N0}I2
)
. (49)
With the derived covariance matrix γAB3 , following
procedure on secret key rate calculation is quite similar
as the case in asymptotic limit regime and by traversing
through the confidence interval, the lower bound of the
secret key rate under finite-size effect can be figured.
The derivation of three-mode covariance matrix is
little complicated. We need to take reconsideration
of elements which are varying because of the shot-
noise unit fluctuations of the covariance matrix. As
is described above, the variance of Bob is modified as
[Tηeηd(V − 1 + εc) + 1]/N0, the variance of mode C can
be modified by using the element VB3 subsequently as:
VC =
(VB3 − 1)
ηd
(1− ηd) + 1. (50)
Further the covariance elements of the matrix also alter
as:
< AB3 >=
√
Tηdηe(V 2 − 1)/N0,
< AC >= − < AB3 >
√
(1− ηd)/ηd,
< B3C >= −(VB3 − 1)
√
(1− ηd)ηd/ηd.
(51)
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So the elements in covariance matrix γACB3 which the shot-noise unit attributes to have all been modified and
the matrix is rewritten as:
γACB3 =

 V I2 −
√
Tηe(1− ηd)(V 2 − 1)/N0σz
√
Tηeηd(V 2 − 1)/N0σz
−
√
Tηe(1− ηd)(V 2 − 1)/N0σz [(VB3 − 1)(1− ηd)/ηd]I2 −[(VB3 − 1)
√
ηd(1− ηd)/ηd]σz√
Tηeηd(V 2 − 1)/N0σz −[(VB3 − 1)
√
ηd(1 − ηd)/ηd]σz VB3I2

 .
(52)
By setting failure probability of parameter estimation,
the confidence interval is able to be identified. Then the
lower bound of the secret key rate under finite-size effect
can be procured by traversing the shot-noise unit value
through the confidence interval. With the modified co-
variance matrix γACB3 , further procedures to calculate
secret key rate can be followed.
C. Numerical simulation and discussion
In this subsection, we give numerical simulation results
of firstly the two one-time-calibration model aforemen-
tioned as well as the original two-time-calibration model
to make comparison. The comparisons between these
models under finite-size regime are also provided subse-
quently.
Fig.6 shows the secret key rate as a function of the
transmission distance for different SNU calibration mod-
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Secret key rate as a function of trans-
mission distance with the original two-time-evaluation model
and two one-time-evaluation models under different variances
in the asymmetric scenario in case of the distance from 0
to 200km(main figure) and in case of the distance from 0 to
25km(inset). The channel excess noise is set as εc = 0.01, the
electronic noise vele = 0.01, the limited detection efficiency
ηd = 0.6 and the reconciliation efficiency η = 0.956.
els. Solid line, dashed line and pointed line represent
simulation results under different variance V of 40, 20
and 4 respectively. Red lines represents the three-mode
one-time-calibration model, blue lines represents the two-
mode one-time-calibration model and black lines repre-
sents original evaluation model. The secret key rates
among these three models can be exceedingly close un-
der variance V = 4, for the scenarios of variance V = 20
and V = 40, the secret key rate of three-mode one-time-
calibration model and original evaluation model are still
very close while the secret key rate of the two-mode
model is slightly lower than the other two models. This
implies that the one-time evaluation models we proposed
are suitable in estimating the secret key rate especially
for the three-mode one-time evaluation model, which is
considerably approaching to the original two-time evalu-
ation model.
Fig.7 is the simulation result of tolerable excess noise
(TEN) versus the transmission distance: solid line,
dashed line and pointed line are results under variance V
of 40, 20 and 4 respectively. Red lines denotes the three-
mode one-time-calibration model, blue lines denotes two-
mode one-time-calibration model and black lines denotes
the original evaluation model. It can be seen that three-
mode model and original two-time-evaluation model can
tolerate the highest excess noise under all three differ-
ent variances whereas the two-mode one-time-evaluation
model is not as outperformance as the other two models.
We define a secret key rate disparity as
|Rnew−Roriginal|
Roriginal
to intuitively demonstrate the degree of difference be-
tween the one-time-calibration models with the original
two-time-calibration model. From the previous simula-
tion results we realise that the secret key rates of the
one-time-calibration models are not exceeding that of
the two-time-calibration model. Thus this disparity can
show how close the two one-time-calibration models ap-
proach to the two-time-calibration model. The lower per-
centage suggests a smaller divergence in the secret key
rate compares to the two-time-calibration model. As can
be seen from Fig.8, the three-mode model is consider-
ably outperformance the two-mode model. The secret
key rate of the three-mode model with variance 4 can
achieve a as low as 0.64% divergence compare to the
two-time-calibration model. On balance, the one-time-
evaluation model is rather appropriate to be utilized to
estimate the lower bound of the information that Alice
and Bob can share and the one-time-calibration model
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Tolerable excess noise as a function
of transmission distance with the original two-time-evaluation
model and the two one-time-evaluation models under differ-
ent variances. The electronic noise vele = 0.01, the limited
detection efficiency ηd = 0.6 and the reconciliation efficiency
η = 0.956.
with three-mode performs better than the two-mode one-
time-evaluation model.
Both Fig.9 and Fig.10 show the protocol performance
of the two one-time-calibration models and the original
two-time-evaluation model under the finite-size regime.
The following parameters are taken into the simulations:
the failure probability of parameter estimation εPE , the
failure probability during privacy amplification proce-
dure εPA and the smoothing parameter ε¯ are all set as
10−10 [38]. The dimension of the Hilbert space of the
variable x in the raw key is set as dimHx = 2. The block
length is set as 1010 and half of the data is used to per-
form parameter so the left is used to exact the secret
key. One-time-calibration model with two-mode scenario
is depicted using blue lines, the three-mode scenario is
depicted using red lines while black lines represent the
original two-time-evaluation model. Solid lines, dashed
lines and pointed lines are corresponding to the condition
of variance V = 40, 20, 4 respective.
Fig.9 shows the secret key rate as a function of trans-
mission distance, solid line, dashed line and pointed line
are results under variance V of 40, 20 and 4 respectively.
Red lines denotes the three-mode one-time-calibration
model, blue lines denotes two-mode one-time-calibration
model and black lines denotes the original evaluation
model. In the case of variance V = 40 the secret key rates
of both two-mode one-time-calibration model and three-
mode one-time-calibration model are as quite close to the
original two-time-evaluation model for about 70km, af-
ter that, the original evaluation model achieves a sightly
higher secret key rate. For a smaller variance of V = 4,
the secret key rate of three-mode one-time-calibration
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Secret key rate disparity as a function
of transmission distance with two one-time-evaluation models
over original two-time-evaluation model under different vari-
ances. Channel excess noise is set as εc = 0.01, the electronic
noise vele = 0.01, the limited detection efficiency ηd = 0.6 and
the reconciliation efficiency η = 0.956.
model is basically the same as the original two-time-
evaluation model, also, the transmission distance of the
two-mode one-time-evaluation model is not as far as the
other two models.
Simulation results of tolerable excess noise versus
transmission distance is displayed in Fig.10, solid line,
dashed line and pointed line are results under variance V
of 40, 20 and 4 respectively. Red lines denotes the three-
mode one-time-calibration model, blue lines denotes two-
mode one-time-calibration model and black lines denotes
the original evaluation model.. In the case of variance
V = 20 and V = 4, the tolerable excess noise is almost
the same for three-mode model and original two-time-
evaluation model, both higher than the two-mode model.
With variance V = 40, the original calibration model ap-
pears to have little higher tolerable excess noise than the
other models.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
We implement a proof of principle experiment to verify
the feasibility of the one-time-calibration model. Since
the three-mode model is outperforming than the two-
mode model analysed in Sec. IV, three-mode one-time-
evaluation model is used in the following. The schematic
diagram of the complete optical layout is delineated in
Fig. 11. In the experiment coherent state protocol with
homodyne detection technique is adopted where the le-
gitimate party Alice generates coherent states from the
laser and the other legitimate party Bob uses homodyne
detector to randomly measure one of the quadratures
13
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Distance (km)
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Se
cr
et
 k
ey
 ra
te
 (b
its
/pu
lse
)
V=40, TTE
V=40, two-mode OTE
V=40, three-mode OTE
V=20, TTE
V=20, two-mode OTE
V=20, three-mode OTE
V=4, TTE
V=4, two-mode OTE
V=4, three-mode OTE
FIG. 9. (Color online) Secret key rate as a function of
transmission distance with the original two-time-evaluation
model and the two one-time-evaluation models under different
variances V = 40, 20, 4 in the finite-size regime. Electronic
noise is set as vele = 0.01, the channel excess noise εc = 0.01,
the limited detection efficiency ηd = 0.6 and the reconciliation
efficiency η = 0.956.
of the electromagnetic field. The experiment employs
a 49.85km fiber with the total channel loss 11.62dB.
In this PM model, the standard 1550nm telecom laser
followed with two high-extinction amplitude modulators
supplies 40ns coherent optical pulses which correspond
to a duty circle of 20% with a frequency of 5MHz. The
pulses are then separated by the 1:99 beam splitter where
the majority of them is treated as LO, the rest of the
pulses are modulated by an amplitude modulator and an
phase modulator subsequently so that a centered Gaus-
sian distribution can be achieved. After the proper at-
tenuation which can optimize the modulation variance
and delay line, the signal is polarization and time multi-
plexed with the LO. At Bob’s side, the incoming signal
of both the signal pulses and the LO pulses are first com-
pensated by the dynamic polarization controller (DPC)
to offset the polarization drifts. The polarization extinc-
tion ratio after the DPC maintains at a high level which
attributes to separate the signal from the LO. Another
delay line is used on Bob’s side to compensate the time
delay. The manipulations of the LO can be more com-
plicated on Bob’s side. 10% of the LO is used for clock
synchronization, data synchronization and LO monitor.
The phase modulator in the LO path is responsible for
phase compensation and random selection of the mea-
sured optical quadrature. An 80MHz shot-noise-limited
balanced pulsed homodyne detector are then applied to
detect the quantum signal.
One optical switch is adopted in the signal path in the
receiver side, which corresponds to the corresponding EB
model presented in Sec. III. During the experiment, the
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Tolerable excess noise as a function
of transmission distance with the original two-time-evaluation
model and the two one-time-evaluation models under dif-
ferent variances V = 40, 20, 4 in the finite-size regime. The
electronic noise vele = 0.01, the limited detection efficiency
ηd = 0.6 and the reconciliation efficiency η = 0.956.
SNU calibration process and the key distributing pro-
cess alternatively. When the SNU calibration process is
on, the optical switch is disconnected. When the opti-
cal switch is switched on, the key distribution process is
executed.
In order to investigate the performance between
the one-time calibration method and the conventional
method, the electronic noise which is not a necessity
any more in the one-time-calibration model is specifically
measured in which cases another optical switch is put
in the LO path of the receiver side. In the process of
SNU calibration, the optical switches on both the signal
path and the LO path are first both switched off, then
switch on the optical switch on the signal path. After the
SNU calibration, the optical switch in the signal path also
switch on and the key distribution process continues.
The calibration scheme used in this experiment offers
several advantages over the conventional calibration pro-
cedure. The LO power is surely retained since the op-
tical switch is no longer a necessity in the experiment
implementation. This can be crucial when the trans-
mission distance reaches certain distance since the power
of the LO is required to attain a certain level so that
the quantum signal can be properly amplified during
the interference of the homodyne detection. The one-
time-calibration scheme also offers simpler implementa-
tion easier data control as we only need to control one
optical switch to complete the SNU calibration and the
key distribution and this is also suitable in the local local
oscillator scenario.
The basis sifting and parameter estimation of the post-
processing are with low computational complexity, thus
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FIG. 11. (Color online) Optical layout of the experiment. Alice uses two high extinction ratio modulators and amplitude
and phase modulator to prepare Gaussian distributed coherent states. Combined with strong local oscillator, the signals are
multiplexed using polarizing beamsplitter and then sent through the quantum channel. The states are demultiplexed on Bobs
side after the polarization compensation from the active dynamic polarization controller. The signal and local oscillator interfere
on a shot-noise-limited balanced pulsed homodyne detector while the LO also attributes to the clock and data synchronization.
Laser: continuous-wave laser; AM: amplitude modulator; PM: phase modulator; BS: beamsplitter; VATT: variable attenuator;
PBS: polarizing beamsplitter; DPC: dynamic polarization controller; PD: photodetector.
can be implemented on a CPU. The multidimensional
reconciliation and multi-edge type LDPC codes are com-
bined to perform the information reconciliation which is
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FIG. 12. (Color online) Secret key rate as a function of
channel loss with the conventional two-time-calibration model
and the one-time evaluation model in both the asymptotic
regime and the finite-size regime. The red solid star is the
mean secret key rate in our experiment under the asymptotic
regime, while the purple star is the mean secret key rate in
our experiment under the finite-size regime.
suitable to achieve high efficiency at low SNRs [39, 40].
The privacy amplification is implemented by using a hash
Toeplitz function [41, 42]. A high reconciliation efficiency
will inevitably results in a low frame error rate, so this
trade-off is needed to be carefully mapped out. In this
paper the optimal reconciliation efficiency of 95.01% by
using a rate-adaptive reconciliation protocol [43] is in-
vestigated that will conduce to maximise the secret key
rate.
The final secret key rates versus the channel loss in
dB using one-time-evaluation method and using two-time
evaluation method are depicted in Fig.12 for both the
asymptotic scenario and the finite-size scenario. The se-
cret key rate of the one-time-calibration model is in fact
not higher than the conventional model. This is due to
the fact that the one-time evaluation model treat the elec-
tronic noise as a channel loss in the secret key rate calcu-
lation, however, with this negligible sacrifice, we manage
to achieve a seamless switchover with the SNU calibra-
tion stage and the key distribution stage by using only
one optical switch. This makes the real time monitoring
of the SNU possible and would surely attributes to the
future commercial implementations. Besides, the SNU
estimated of using the one-time-evaluation model is more
precisely because of the reduced variables that causes sta-
tistical fluctuations which provides a tighter bound of the
secret key rates. Even with the slightly diminution, the
one-time-calibration model still provide a comparable se-
cret key rate.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a shot-noise unit calibration
procedure that only demands one step to calibrate the
shot-noise unit. We derive the complete entanglement-
based model that corresponds to the proposed one-
time-calibration procedure and provide fully analysis on
its performance. Complete experiment implementations
based on the coherent states homodyne scheme are con-
ducted to experimentally testify its feasibility. We first
review the conventional shot-noise unit calibration pro-
cedures and sketch the limitations in the existing model
while we we propose the one-time-calibration method
that can extended the security under a more general noise
environment where the relative-intensity noise can be ad-
dressed properly. It will not only simplify the evaluation
procedures but also accurates the estimated shot-noise
unit, which makes it more close to the actual commercial
implementation. We perform security analysis against
arbitrary collective attacks and secret key rate calcula-
tion on a two-mode version of the entanglement-based
model subsequently put forward a three-mode calibra-
tion entanglement-based model by permuting the order
of beamsplitters that further improving the model be-
haviour. We further show the performance of the one-
time-calibration model under finite-size regime. Our re-
sults from both the theoretical and experimental perspec-
tives manifest that the one-time-calibration model can
essentially achieve nearly the same performance as the
conventional calibration model especially for the three-
mode model in both the asymptotic limit regime and the
finite-size regime. Our proposal provides a better substi-
tution for the shot-noise unit evaluation procedure.
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